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Knowledge is not necessarily true

In this essay I hope to establish that truth is not a necessary condition for knowledge. This is not to go so far as that it is possible to know falsehoods, since not everything that is not true is therefore false. Rather the aim is to show that knowledge is that in which we are fully confident, where our confidence is supported by conclusive evidence. If these two conditions are met, then there is no further condition, truth, that needs to be met in order for us to be in possession of knowledge. 

First, I will sketch a working theory of knowledge. In order to know, two conditions must be met:

1. Full confidence.
2. Evidence that justifies this confidence to relevant third parties.

Both these conditions can be measured in terms of attitudes to bets. Full confidence is the state of mind in which the subject will bet at any odds for a claim and will not bet at any odds against a claim. According to the subjective interpretations of Ramsey and De Finetti such a state of mind can be measured as a probability of 1. The subject who knows will bet at any odds for a proposition and will not bet at any odds against because the subject knows that she will win the bet. The subject will also consider bets settled. By settled I mean that the subject who knows will not require any further evidence before deciding the matter settled and granting the stakes to the winner. Of course, betting is like tango, one can’t bet with oneself. So merely knowing isn’t enough to settle bets, it must be generally agreed by the other participants in the bet that you know.
This brings us on to the second condition. In order to know, one must have evidence that justifies settling bets to relevant third parties. If you cannot produce such evidence, then the third parties will be legitimately in doubt as to whether you know. But if they do accept that you know, then your testimony alone will be sufficient to settle bets, without the need to produce evidence. However, even in this case, they would expect that you could produce evidence, were it not for the inconvenience of doing so. 
Harman, in Thoughts, discusses potential counterexamples to both these conditions. The conditions I have given I have couched in betting terms in order to make it very clear what these conditions amount to, with a system of measurement by which, at least hypothetically, it can be verified in particular instances whether these conditions are met. Ordinarily such clarity is omitted and the two conditions are left vague. Harman gives the two conditions as being that knowledge implies belief, and that “we can know something only if we are justified in believing it” (Harman 1974, p.115). To the second condition he gives the following putative counterexample: “I know that Columbus discovered America in 1492 but it is not obvious that there are any reasons for which I now believe this, although there once were.” 
Now consider that we are betting on whether Columbus discovered America in 1492. Let us accept Harman’s first statement: “I know that Columbus discovered America in 1492.” If we accept this, then Harman’s testimony is enough to settle our bet. So in this case, Harman does not have to actually produce evidence, since we are already satisfied that he knows. But let us now consider the case where we don’t accept that Harman knows. We doubt this, and therefore we doubt his testimony. In this case, we won’t attribute knowledge to him unless he can provide evidence that will satisfy us. This he can surely do. He can direct us to any reliable historical reference book.
It may be objected that the existence of reference books is an unusual feature of the example. There are things we know that are not so easily proven. However, I think that the example is chosen just because the year of Columbus’s discovery is an item of common knowledge. Suppose instead that Harman had used a highly controversial statement to illustrate his point. Suppose he claimed to know that there were in fact weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but he couldn’t for the life of him remember the reasons he had for believing it. In this case, I wager, we would be more reluctant to take his self ascription of knowledge at face value. We would reject his claim that he knows there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, without necessarily asserting that there are none. 
Harman also considers cases where one is not confident but guesses the right answer. For example that Columbus discovered America in 1492. If the answer is in fact right and this was caused by a proper connection to the facts, then we might be inclined to attribute knowledge even though the subject is not fully confident. Again, the betting analysis gives a definitive answer to this. If someone claimed to be only guessing, would we take their testimony as sufficient to settle a bet? Of course not! But given that we know already that Columbus discovered America in 1492, then we might attribute knowledge to anyone who guessed correctly, and assume that they had sufficient evidence. The illusion that they knew would again disappear completely if we change the case to something that is not common knowledge. It just wouldn’t count as knowledge by anyone’s book if someone guessed that London would be below sea level by 2020, regardless of whether their prediction turned out to be the case. 
The betting analysis gives the right answer in Gettier cases too. Suppose someone has good evidence to suggest that Jones has a car and concludes that either Jones or Smith has a car. It turns out that Jones does not have a car but Smith does. The subject here has a justified true belief that either Jones or Smith has a car, but does not know this. Why do we think that he does not know this? Because he can’t provide evidence that would convince us that Jones or Smith have a car. Whatever evidence he provides for this claim is evidence that Jones has a car, and this evidence is undermined by the fact that we know that Jones doesn’t have a car. So he cannot produce evidence that would be sufficient for the relevant third parties, in this case us, to consider the matter settled. Were it not for the fact that Jones does not have a car on the other hand, we might be prepared to settle bets on what is ostensibly the same evidence. 
To complete this sketch, let us consider scepticism. I claim to know that I have two hands. I will bet at any odds on this claim and not bet against it. The reason for my confidence is that I can clearly see my hands. Anyone betting on this proposition would be satisfied by the evidence that I could easily give. I could show them my hands. So on the betting analysis, I know I have two hands. But suppose a sceptical gambler refused to accept this evidence on the grounds that he could be dreaming, and his visual experience of my hands an illusion. This sceptical hypothesis clearly does nothing to undermine my evidence, because if he is dreaming, how is it that I can see my own hands? And if I am dreaming, then he is just a character in my dream, and should consider the matter of my having two hands being settled in the dream world in which he exists. However, we can also see that the sceptic, in refusing to acknowledge that my evidence is bet settling, is also refusing to acknowledge that I know. 
There is a further issue related to probability that I will give a cursory mention. It is often suggested that a degree of belief 1 is too great a demand. Harman points out that knowledge comes in different strengths, so the confidence threshold must be less than 1. This issue is complex and not directly relevant to the matter at hand, but briefly it seems reasonable to adjust your betting odds according to the person you are betting with and the stakes involved. We have already seen that we are inclined to require less evidence from someone who claims to know a proposition that we are already apprised of, whereas for a proposition that we find controversial we demand more evidence before we attribute knowledge. Likewise, claims that will have a significant affect on our world view will require a greater level of evidential support than ones which we find scarcely surprising. We can measure this contextual variation in what counts as sufficient evidence in terms of what is at stake. If the stakes are high we ordinarily demand a lot more evidence before considering a matter settled. This gives the extra dimension we need to solve Harman’s problem. If you know to only a small degree, you will be able to produce evidence that will only suffice to convince those who are already disposed to believe and will only suffice to settle small bets. If you know to a much higher degree, you will be able to demonstrate the truth of what you say to even those who find it intuitively implausible, and you will be able to settle bets even when the stakes are very high. 
Knowledge of skills

An advantage of this betting theory of knowledge is that we don’t need the knowledge that and knowledge how distinction introduced by Gilbert Ryle. We can bet on know how, we can settle bets by demonstrations and our confidence is warranted by our experience. For example, I know how to make a cup of tea. I am confident enough in my tea making skills to bet at any odds for, but at no odds against. Also, anyone who trusts my testimony will accept my word as bet settling criteria. 
I can demonstrate that I know how to make a cup of tea by simply making a cup of tea. To someone especially sceptical, who had a very large wager on, I may have to make several cups of tea before he considered the matter settled, since he might claim that the first was a one off fluke. 

So given that it is possible to know these skills, if truth is a necessary condition for knowledge, these skills must be true. But it is not immediately obvious that there is anything to be true. When I (truthfully) claim to know how to make a cup of tea then the obvious candidate for truth is “how to make a cup of tea”, and “how to make a cup of tea” is not truth apt. The content of my knowledge in this case is not clearly a candidate for truth. So, prima facie, we have a candidate for knowledge without truth. 
Knowledge of Conditionals

A response to this objection to the necessity of truth to knowledge might be to claim that all know how is actually propositional knowledge in disguise. This is to collapse the know how/know that distinction, as Stanley and Williamson (2001) do. This is plausible enough just so long as propositions includes anything that can be put into a sentential form, and includes conditionals. 
So the statement that 
1. I know how to make a cup of tea 
Is equivalent to a statement a long the lines of
2. I know that if I put a tea bag into a cup and pour on boiling water, a cup of tea will result. 
Conditionals, at least according to Frege, are propositions that are truth apt. So the knowledge I have is of a conditional statement, which is a proposition. In general, dispositions can be characterised in terms of conditional statements, so this approach should generalise to all knowledge how. 
But this is problematic, because although Frege still commands a lot of respect, his hundred year old analysis of conditionals is not the right one, at least for these purposes. In order to demonstrate this I will give an example where a conditional is known according to the betting analysis, and also according to intuition, but that the conditional known is clearly not the material conditional, and furthermore, seems to lack a truth value.
I claim to know that if I dive from the diving board of the local swimming pool I will land in the pool (as opposed to the surrounding tiles). I will bet at any odds you like for this proposition and no odds against. If you grant that I know, I will settle bets without further ado. The evidence I have for this confidence is that I have dived many times from the diving board and always landed in the pool. Also, my general knowledge about gravity, momentum and the strength in my legs makes it seem impossible that I should ever miss the pool from the diving board. In short, I know that if I dive from the diving board I will land in the pool. 
Now let us suppose you bet me a thousand pounds that I am wrong, that it is not true that if I jump from the diving board I will land in the pool. If my knowledge is of a material conditional, I can win this bet easily by refusing to ever again dive from the diving board. In this case, the antecedent is false, so the material conditional is true. But, in all fairness, I have not provided evidence to settle the bet by refusing to dive from the diving board and you owe me nothing. This is not to say that I do not know that if I dive from the diving board I will land in the pool. It is just that the conditional is not true. So here is a case of non factive knowledge. 
The reason why I have not won the bet, is that by refusing to bring about the condition, I have equally demonstrated that if I dive from the diving board, I will not land in the pool, which is the scenario that you were backing. Whatever we were betting on, it was not Frege’s material conditional. The material conditional analysis of conditonals is the only plausible truth conditional analysis. For clarity, in what follows I shall define a proposition as anything that necessarily conforms to the law of excluded middle. What is at issue is whether hypothetical conditionals are propositions in this sense. 
The view that conditionals are propositions is not widely accepted by any means. Peirce analyses them as forms of inference, or arguments (1949, p.67). Ramsey (1929 p.155) follows suit and analyses them as conditional degrees of belief or conditional probabilities. Edgington, (2006) arguably the current authority on the philosophy of conditionals, takes Ramsey’s line and traces it back to Bayes, calling it the “suppositional theory”. Lewis (2001) proved that there is no proposition such that its probability is necessarily equal to the conditional probability of a consequent given an antecedent. He later argued from this basis against any correspondence theory of truth. 
If we can know the conditional, then we can know the conditional without knowing whether it is true or not, since if the condition doesn’t hold, the conditional won’t be true. I argue that we both can know conditionals and that conditional statements are not propositions. 
The analysis of conditionals I offer here is this:
1. If A then C
Is equivalent to: 
Probability C given A = 1
The latter statement is to be analysed not in terms of truth conditions, but in terms of successful betting behaviour. Success requires that you have sufficient evidence to convince the relevant parties that the bet is settled. This is akin to the old Humean view that causal connections are habits of mind, habitual inferences engrained into us by their past success. 
Knowledge of universally quantified statements

What we might want to say about this is that my knowledge lies not in the specific conditional itself, but rather this specific conditional issues from a more general knowledge. What I know is some expression like:
For all x, if x is relevantly similar to me and x dives from the diving board, then x lands in the pool. 
We can see why a defender of the factivity of knowledge would be pleased with this proposal. Here is a statement, which, ignoring the vagueness of “relevantly similar to me”, is truth apt. It is true or false objectively and mind independently, and I know it only if it is true. The problem is, I don’t know it if it is true. I don’t claim to know it. It is a much bigger claim than the modest conditional upon which I was prepared to settle bets. I don’t know whether one day, in the future or the past, someone will dive off the diving board wearing a jet pack, or that a freak gust of wind will catch her, or that a fat swan will collide with him at such high speed that he will be knocked right off the edge of the pool.
This desire to turn conditional knowledge into knowledge of universal generalisations has caused endless problems for philosophers. We can take the paradox of the ravens as a case in point. The hypothesis that all ravens are black is, supposedly, confirmed by its instances. But the same instances also confirm the hypothesis that all but one raven is black. Unless we have a fixed idea about the total number of ravens, no number of observations of black ravens will distinguish between these two hypotheses. Relative to each other, and without knowing the total number of ravens, no number of sightings of black ravens will confirm one over the other. But now let us take the more modest conditional: 
If you find me a raven, it will be black.
I can bet on this conditional easily, I can have a sequence of bets on this conditional. I am fully confident that I will win them all, up to a certain level of stakes of course, lest I give an incentive for someone to go hunting for grey ravens, which I believe might exist in Alaska. Now it is clear that instances of this conditional confirm the belief in the conditional. Even if the occasional non black raven turned up, I should just adjust the odds down to accommodate the occasional loss. Also, there is no question of confirming this conditional by producing a non black non raven, if we take the conditional view of scientific knowledge and causal law, the paradox of the ravens does not arise. 
The universal generalisation, as pointed out by Popper, (1974, p.69) is unverifiable, it is only falsifiable, so the only sensible degree of belief to have in a universal generalisation  is 0. Whereas the conditionals are verifiable, endlessly so, and we have clear mathematical procedures for measuring the degree of confirmation, at least in some cases. We just take the rate at which such inferences have proved successful and call that the probability. So it seems reasonable to suggest that we can know the conditional without knowing the universal generalisation. The problem of induction only applies to the universal generalisation. 
Knowledge of Preferences
As Edgington points out, it is not only beliefs that come in conditional form, but also desires (Lillehammer and Mellor, 2005, p.51). What is abundantly clear is that we can have knowledge of other peoples preferences, when these preferences are in the form of conditionals. Also, seeing as we are a warring, lovemaking and trading species, it is easily arguable that our cognitive systems are geared to be especially good at knowing people’s preferences. 
Suppose Marion has observed that every time I have been offered a choice between tea and coffee, I have always chosen tea. She thus comes to know that I prefer tea to coffee. I visit her in her house and she considers offering me tea or coffee. Given her evidence she knows I will choose tea. So Marion knows that if she offers me tea or coffee I will choose tea. This counts as knowledge according to the betting analysis because, before she actually makes the offer, she will bet with a third party at any odds and fully expect to win. Anyone who considers her an authority on my preferences will accept her testimony as proof that I will choose tea. To anyone else, she can demonstrate that I prefer tea to coffee by offering me the choice, and demonstrating that I choose tea. 
There is a metaphysical issue here concerning the factivity of knowledge that might lead us to reject the idea that we ever know such things. Here are three plausible statements that lead to a contradiction:
THE FUTURE IS KNOWABLE:  It is possible to know a head of time what someone will choose.
THE FUTURE IS FREE: A choice is only free if it is possible that we could have chosen otherwise.
KNOWLEDGE IS FACTIVE:  If something is known, then it cannot be false. 

The problem arises when someone knows in advance what choice will be made. The factivity of knowledge entails that this choice cannot be otherwise. A choice that cannot be otherwise isn’t free. It is best to illustrate this with an example. I am in the living room and Marion is in the kitchen with Chris. Marion knows that if she offers me tea or coffee, I will choose tea.
Marion knows this and so offers Chris a bet at any odds that if she offers me tea or coffee, I will choose tea. As long as the bet is with Chris, she will win the bet. But from my point of view, it now appears as if I have no choice. The factivity of knowledge means that it is true that I will choose tea.
So given that Marion knows that I will choose tea if she offers tea or coffee and Marion has offered me tea or coffee, it follows from logical necessity that I will choose tea. Therefore I am not free to choose coffee. But this is absurd. Marion can’t force me to choose tea by predicting that I will. 
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